The use of mixed models in a modified Iowa Gambling Task and a prisoner’s dilemma game by Stockard, Jean et al.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 2007, pp. 9–22
The use of mixed models in a modified Iowa Gambling Task and a
prisoner’s dilemma game
Jean Stockard∗
Department of Planning, Public Policy, and Management
University of Oregon
Robert M. O’Brien
Department of Sociology
University of Oregon
Ellen Peters
Decision Research
Eugene, Oregon
Abstract
Researchers in the decision making tradition usually analyze multiple decisions within experiments by aggregating
choices across individuals and using the individual subject as the unit of analysis. This approach can mask important
variations and patterns within the data. Specifically, it ignores variations in decisions across a task or game and possible
influences of characteristics of the subject or the experiment on these variations. We demonstrate, by reanalyzing data
from two previously published articles, how a mixed model analysis addresses these limitations. Our results, with a
modified Iowa gambling task and a prisoner’s dilemma game, illustrate the ways in which such an analysis can test
hypotheses not possible with other techniques, is more parsimonious, and is more likely to be faithful to theoretical
models.
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1 Introduction
Experiments within the broad decision making tradition
can involve subjects making multiple decisions, either
with different partners or groups (e.g., Dawes & Messick,
2000) or as repeated decisions in a learning task (e.g.,
Damasio, 1994). Analyses of these data typically involve
examination of how the rewards received are related to
characteristics of the experiment and/or the individuals
involved (e.g., Andreoni & Petrie, 2004; Bechara et al.,
1996; Knutson et al., 2001; Parco et al., 2002). Complex
multivariate analyses are relatively rare.1
This typical analytic approach has at least one major
drawback. Most studies in this tradition involve multi-
ple decisions for each individual. That is, each subject
participates in several decisions. It is entirely possible
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1An important exception is the recent work of Yechiam and Buse-
meyer (2005, see also Busemeyer & Stout 2002; Yechiam, et al., 2005;
and Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2006) who explicitly analyzed models of
choices in repeated play games. While these models are persuasive,
we suggest that the techniques we describe are more general, are more
flexible and can apply to more situations, and can incorporate important
theoretical elements regarding repeated choices within decision making
experiments by the way in which variables related to both the subjects
and the experimental design can be considered.
that individuals vary their decisions across the rounds of
play in which they engage. Looking at the average of
the results of these decisions could mask important vari-
ations and patterns within the data. Aggregated analyses
do not allow the researcher to fully examine the ways in
which characteristics of participants and the experimen-
tal design affect decisions. In other words, these analy-
ses can provide descriptive results, but only hints of the
decision-making dynamics within the experiments. We
suggest that data from these experiments fit the classic
form of multi-level, or nested, data sets in that they usu-
ally include multiple decisions from an actor, within one
or more set conditions. Mixed models have been specifi-
cally developed to deal with multi-level units of observa-
tion and can help us understand the process or dynamics
of decision making within our studies.
In this paper we describe the logic of mixed model
analyses, contrasting them with the familiar within- and
between- subject designs. We then demonstrate the use
of these models with decision making data by reanalyz-
ing data from two previously published articles. The first
study (Peters & Slovic, 2000) involves a modification of
the Iowa Gambling Task with multiple decisions by indi-
vidual players in response to a variety of stimuli, and the
second (Mulford, et al., 1998) involves prisoner dilemma
games conducted within seven person groups. Finally, we
briefly describe the wide range of possible applications
9
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Table 1: Examples of within subject, between subject,
and mixed model designs.
1) The pure within subjects design: (A×B×S) design:
A1 A2
b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3
S1
S2
S3
S4
2) The pure between subjects design. Subjects are
nested within A and B: A×B:
A1 A2
b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3
S1 S5 S9 S13 S17 S21
S2 S6 S10 S14 S18 S22
S3 S7 S11 S15 S19 S23
S4 S8 S12 S16 S20 S24
3) The mixed or split-plot design with (B) as the within
subjects factor and (A) as the between subjects factor:
A×(B×S) design:
A1 A2
b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3
S1 S5
S2 S6
S3 S7
S4 S8
and the advantages of the approach, provide pragmatic
advice for using hierarchical models, and encourage their
broader use in decision making research. Although the
major aim of this paper is to illustrate the utility of this
method, we include an appendix with the SAS language
used for our analyses to provide greater transparency and
encourage use of the method.
1.1 The logic of mixed model analyses
A mixed model is one in which there are both between-
and within-subject variables. As noted above, studies in
the decision research literature often focus exclusively
on between-subject variables in their analyses and ignore
within-subject variables, those that affect the variations
in decisions that one individual makes. Yet, variations in
individuals’ decisions are often theoretically and substan-
tively important. Thus, we argue that it is more natural,
fruitful, and parsimonious to analyze many decision mak-
ing studies using a mixed model approach. In addition,
mixed models are very flexible and can adapt to a wide
variety of experimental designs.
In a pure within-subjects design, all of the subjects
serve in all of the treatment conditions. The first panel
of Table 1 illustrates this design, assuming that there
are two different design elements (A and B). In this de-
sign, each subject (Si) participates in each condition of
design element A (Aj) and design element B (Bk). An
example would be the classic Lichtenstein and Slovic
(1973) study in which gamblers in a Las Vegas casino
showed within-subject preference reversals based on re-
sponse mode (bids and choices).
The pure between-subjects design is one in which each
subject serves in only a single condition and there is no
within-subject variation. This design is illustrated in the
second panel of Table 1, where each subject (Si) is in
only one condition of the two design conditions (A and
B). In other words, in the pure between- subjects design,
subjects are nested within A and B: A×B; each subject
contributes a single observation on the dependent vari-
able and thus appears in only a single treatment condi-
tion. Many decision making studies use this design (e.g.,
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Scharlemann et al., 2001)
or simplify their data to mimic this design by summariz-
ing across all of the decisions that an individual makes to
form a summary score (Andreoni & Petrie, 2004; Parco
et al., 2002). This summary number is then used as the
dependent variable.
Researchers also use a design that involves repeated
measures or conditions for one or more factors that are
presented to each subject (within-subject variables such
as a set of rewards in a neuroimaging study) and variables
such as gender or culture or experimental conditions such
as positive and negative frames that subjects do not share
(between-subject variables). This design is frequently re-
ferred to by psychologists as a mixed design and is illus-
trated in the third part of Table 1, with B as the within-
subjects factor and A as the between-subjects factor. The
term mixed is particularly apt in that there are sources
of variance that are produced by between-subjects differ-
ences and by within-subjects differences and both types
of differences contribute to the statistical analysis.2 This
2Sometimes researchers slip into mixed models when they use a
paired t-test to see if a subject is more likely to cooperate when us-
ing Matrix A than when using Matrix B. We could use a paired t-test
analysis that takes advantage of having two summary scores from each
subject. But, as we will see, we can do this and much more by shifting
our unit of analysis from the individual to the decision. Similarly, mixed
models are more flexible than repeated measures analyses of variance,
which are simply extensions of paired t-tests. The mixed model ap-
proach is most similar in logic to analysis of covariance, but is more
flexible and elegant in its statistical properties. For instance, it allows
us to include a measure of autocorrelation, which indicates the extent to
which subjects do, or do not, make similar decisions from one decision
to the next.
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design allows us to assess within-subject differences at
the same time as we study between-subject relationships.
The design also allows us to model the dependency of
successive decisions, what is technically called auto re-
gression, or the tendency for individuals to behave in a
similar manner from one decision to another.
Researchers have used mixed models in a variety of
settings. Much of the original work on mixed models
was conducted in agricultural settings and thus, statis-
ticians also refer to such models as a split-plot de-
sign. In the agricultural setting, plots were often con-
sidered random with each plot exposed to the same set
of fixed experimental conditions on one of the experi-
mental variables, while the plots were nested within ex-
perimental conditions of a different experimental vari-
able. These mixed designs contain at least one within-
subject (plot) variable and at least one between-subject
(plot) variable (Cochran & Cox, 1957). The panel mod-
els used by economists have both a between-units (of-
ten firms) component and a within-units (changes over
time) component (Green, 2000). Sociologists have used
Hierarchical Linear Models to examine the influence of
characteristics of school classrooms and entire schools
on individual student achievement (e.g. Bryk & Rau-
denbush, 1988). Developmental psychologists and ed-
ucational researchers have used the models to examine
“growth curves,” changes in individuals’ achievement
or developmental characteristics (the within-subject vari-
able) for students varying on different characteristics (the
between-subject analysis) (e.g. Huttenlocher et al., 1991;
see also Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, pp. 5-14).
Thus, there are a wide variety of analytical methods
that pay close attention to within and between individual
(or group) variables. Two widely used general modeling
strategies are hierarchical linear models and mixed mod-
els. Either of these allows for the modeling of random
variation for individuals and of decisions nested within
individuals. For the situations analyzed in this paper, ei-
ther hierarchical linear modeling or a mixed modeling ap-
proach can be used.
We suggest that the general logic of this approach can
be applied to the issues facing experimenters studying de-
cision making and help researchers develop a more accu-
rate understanding of the elements of the decision mak-
ing process that lead to hypothesized outcomes. Within
many such experiments, a given individual makes nu-
merous choices, often across a variety of experimental
settings. Because individuals make multiple decisions,
these decisions are not statistically independent. The
usual method of handling such data is simply to aggre-
gate all decisions to the level of the individual and ignore
any intra-individual variation. Such a practice, however,
ignores potential variation and limits the extent to which
researchers can assess the impact of experimental vari-
ables on individual choice. It also encourages researchers
to conduct numerous separate bivariate analyses. Use
of mixed models can provide both a more inclusive, yet
more parsimonious and efficient, method of analysis. We
now illustrate the utility of these models by reanalyzing
data from two different studies.
2 Study 1: Reactivity to positive
and negative events in a modified
Iowa Gambling Task (Peters &
Slovic, 2000)
Peters and Slovic (2000) examined the relationship of in-
dividual differences in affective information processing
to choices in a game designed to mimic real life decisions
involving gains, losses, and uncertainty. The task was a
modified version of the Iowa Gambling Task. Peters and
Slovic were especially interested in how individual dif-
ferences in reactivity to positive and negative events were
related to decisions. To examine this question, they used
a card-selection task with four decks that varied in gains,
losses, and expected value. Subjects were presented one
card at a time and could either choose or reject the card.
The four decks were labeled A, B, C, and D, and subjects
initially knew nothing else about the decks but learned as
they chose and received feedback about gains and losses.
The task structure and characteristics of the decks are
shown in Table 2.
Below we describe their original analysis and results.
We then present our replication of their original analysis
using mixed modeling and explore additional hypothe-
ses. This additional exploration is only possible with the
increased flexibility afforded by the use of mixed mod-
eling. The additional hypotheses tested were not even
developed in the original paper because it was not possi-
ble to test them with the analytic techniques used in that
paper, yet, as explained below, the additional hypotheses
address important theoretical issues.
2.1 The original analysis
The original work hypothesized that individuals who re-
ported greater reactions to affectively charged events in
life would make choices in this card task that were con-
gruent with their self-reported tendencies for reactivity.
Results consistent with this hypothesis would support the
notion that experienced, anticipatory affective reactions
are one of the mechanisms underlying choice. The study
tested two hypotheses: 1) Greater reactivity to negative
events would be related to fewer choices from high-loss
decks; and 2) Greater reactivity to positive events would
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Table 2: Payoff structure for the modified Iowa gambling card-selection task
Modified Schedule — Decks
Payoff Variables A B C D
Gain Amount $50–$150 $150–$250 $50–$150 $150–$250
Average Gain Amount $100 $200 $100 $200
Probability (Gain) 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.5
Loss Amount $100–$200 $200–$300 $200–$300 $100–$200
Average Loss Amount $150 $250 $250 $150
First loss appears at card 3 or 4 3 or 4 3 or 4 3 or 4
Expected value of a card – $25 – $25 $30 $25
Coding of good decks 0 0 1 1
Coding of high-loss decks 0 1 1 0
Coding of high-gain decks 0 1 0 1
be related to more choices from high-gain decks (Peters
& Slovic, 2000).
Peters and Slovic tested and found support for these
hypotheses by using individual subjects as the unit of
analysis and calculating three separate regression equa-
tions (Table 3, p. 1471). Each of the equations had the
same independent variables, both measures of individ-
ual differences: BIS (a measure of reactivity to negative
events) and Extraversion (a measure of positive reactiv-
ity).3 The equations differed in the dependent variable:
one was the number of selections from the “high-loss
decks” (B and C), one was the number of selections from
high gain decks (B and D), and the third was the number
of selections from “good” decks (C and D). Hypothesis
one predicted that those with high BIS scores would make
fewer choices from the high-loss decks. Hypothesis two
predicted that those with higher scores on “extraversion”
would choose more cards from the high gain decks.
A separate analysis in the original article (Table 4) re-
gressed the number of choices from high-loss decks and
high-gain decks (separately) on the measures of reactivity
(BIS for high-loss decks and extraversion for high-gain
decks) and a measure of conscious knowledge about the
decks. The analysis was conducted for the total group and
for different sets of choices (the first set of 20 choices,
the second, etc.), for a total of 12 regression equations. It
was hypothesized that the relation of reactivity to choices
would be greater in the early parts of the game before
conscious knowledge influenced results. This hypothe-
sis was supported for the analysis of high-loss decks, but
3 A third independent measure (REI-Rational) was also used in the
analysis but was found to be unrelated to the dependent variables. We
have omitted this variable from our reanalysis of the data.
not for the analysis of high-gain decks. Finally, the orig-
inal analysis used correlation coefficients to examine the
possibility that subjects’ current mood state influenced
choices and found no support for this possibility.
2.2 Replicating and extending the analysis
with mixed modeling
The original analysis, as is typical in this area, implic-
itly assumed that events occurring throughout the game,
and the immediate influence of events within the game,
“averaged out” across the entire experience of a subject.
Yet, it is possible that subjects’ experiences from play to
play within the game could influence their individual de-
cisions. For instance, the result of decision one could
affect what the player does in decision two, etc. This
hypothesis would be consistent with immediate experi-
ences producing a mood state that influences subsequent
decisions. In particular, based on the affect heuristic and
affect’s role as information in decisions, we might ex-
pect that a previous positive payoff would produce a pos-
itive mood and that this positive mood would be used as
information in the evaluation of the subsequent choice,
making it more likely that the subsequent deck would be
chosen (Isen, 1997; Peters, 2006). Because their analy-
sis used data aggregated across all decisions, Peters and
Slovic could not test the hypothesis that irrelevant mood
states produced from prior feedback would act as infor-
mation in subsequent choices. As a result, estimates of
the influence of individual differences might be inaccu-
rately specified.
It would also be expected that subjects’ experiences
with a given deck would affect their response when pre-
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 1, No. 2, November 2006 Mixed models, IGT and prisoner’s dilemma 13
sented with that deck again through some type of learning
process. If subjects gained (or lost) money the previous
time a card from a given deck was chosen, they could
well expect to gain (or lose) when given that deck again,
and this would affect their choice. By aggregating across
all the decisions, as occurred in the original analysis, one
cannot adequately test the impact of possible learning on
subjects’ choices.
With mixed modeling, we can control for the possi-
ble influence of the immediate situation and prior feed-
back and thus provide a more stringent test of the individ-
ual differences hypothesis.4 In addition, gambling tasks,
such as the one we analyze here, implicitly assume that
subjects are linear and consistent in their behavior. Only
through actually looking at variations in decisions, as is
possible with mixed modeling, can we examine this im-
plicit assumption.
2.3 Analysis plan
In the present analysis we focus not on the total num-
ber of choices from different types of decks but, instead,
on each individual choice. Thus, instead of looking at
the summary responses of 72 individuals, we look at the
decisions that these individuals made: over 12,000 deci-
sions. Instead of examining the total number of choices
from a particular deck, our dependent variable is the ac-
tual decision that a respondent made – whether or not to
accept a card (choosing a card is coded as “1;” rejecting
a card is coded as “0”).
Our independent variables can be seen as either be-
ing “within subjects” or “between subjects.” The within-
subject variables are those that relate to the individuals’
decisions and allow us to examine the influence of the on-
going experience within the game: the type of deck pre-
sented,5 whether the decision is made early in the experi-
ment, and two variables that reflect the results of subjects’
recent experiences in the game: specifically, the amount
of money that they gained or lost in their previous play as
well as how much money they gained or lost in their most
recent play with the presented deck.
The between-subject variables involve the character-
istics of the individual and interactions of these charac-
teristics with the deck with which they are playing. To
align with the description of the research in the original
4Through including both of these variables in our model we could
be seen as implicitly testing the expectancies and learning models iden-
tified by Yechiam and Busemeyer (2005). The variables related to the
immediate situation may relate to expectancies, while those related to
prior feedback relate to learning. To apply our technique to these learn-
ing models it would, of course, be necessary to create variables that
represented memory of past pay-offs and to use a form of multinomial
logistic regression to analyze the possibility of multiple choices.
5We include dummy variables to represent the three types of decks
(high-loss, good, and high-gain decks). See Table 2 for the specific
codes used.
article (p. 1467), our base model includes, as between-
subject predictors, the BIS score (a measure of negative
reactivity), Extraversion (a measure of positive reactiv-
ity), and the two pre-test measures of mood (positive and
negative) as control variables. To replicate the analysis of
results with different decks, we include four interaction
terms: 1) between BIS and the high-loss decks, 2) be-
tween extraversion and the high-gain decks, 3) between
negative mood and the high-loss decks, and 4) between
positive mood and the high-gain decks. Based on the
original analysis and its results, we expect only the first
two of these interactions to be significant (although the-
oretical reasons exist for all four interaction terms to be
significant). As in Peters and Slovic we use an additional
variable indicating early choices from the decks, adding
a dummy variable for the first 20 choices (we coded a
variable “Early” as “1” if the choice was in the first 20
choices and “0” otherwise), and three-way interactions
of BIS, choices from high-loss decks, and “Early” as well
as extraversion, high-gain choices, and “Early.” Based on
results from the original analysis, we expect a stronger
influence of BIS on the early high-loss choices than later
high-loss choices, but no significant influence of the inter-
action of extraversion scores and early high-gain choices.
The present analysis involves all decisions made in
the game, using Deck A as the omitted category in the
dummy variables for deck, as shown in the coding dis-
played in Table 2. The analysis includes the character-
istics of the deck as independent variables, essentially
looking at how these characteristics affect decisions both
as main effects and in interaction with other variables.
While the original analysis involved 15 separate regres-
sion equations and examined the influence of mood only
through correlations, the present analysis incorporates all
of the proposed independent variables into one model, in-
cluding the measures of mood, thus providing a more par-
simonious test of the hypotheses.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the present
analysis controls for possible influences of the course of
play – the immediate feedback that a player is receiving –
on decisions. These situational variables could be seen as
classic examples of “state” variables, in contrast to the
“trait” variables captured by the BIS and Extraversion
scores. This situational control is thus quite important
in providing a more accurate estimate of the impact of in-
dividual differences (trait variables) on decisions. It also
helps ensure that the models are properly specified be-
cause a broader range of appropriate control variables is
included. In addition, this state variable is an important
potential source of affect that may be used as informa-
tion by decision makers, but that Peters and Slovic were
unable to examine.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 1, No. 2, November 2006 Mixed models, IGT and prisoner’s dilemma 14
Table 3: Regression (HLM) of decision to take a card on last pay, reactivity measures, mood, deck, time in game, and
interactions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fixed Effects Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t
Intercept 0.47 5.77*** 0.56 0.87 0.31 0.47 0.11 0.17
Level 1 (Within-Subject) Variables:
Last Pay −0.001 −8.52*** −0.001 −8.52*** −0.001 −8.47*** −0.001 −8.59***
Last Pay from Deck 0.002 20.12*** 0.002 20.11*** 0.002 19.86*** 0.002 18.27***
Good Deck 0.23 5.87*** 0.23 5.87*** 0.23 5.87*** 0.24 6.15***
High Reward Deck −0.28 −7.24*** −0.28 −7.24*** −1.52 −7.68*** −1.62 −7.69***
High Loss Deck 0.28 7.14*** 0.28 7.14*** 2.13 8.40*** 2.16 8.42***
Early ---- ---- ---- ---- 1.27 3.42***
Level 2 (Between-Subject) Variables:
BIS ---- ---- −0.28 −1.78 −0.03 −0.16 −0.01 −0.08
Extravert ---- ---- −0.001 −0.01 −0.09 −1.31 −0.07 −1.09
Negative mood ---- ---- 0.23 1.17 0.32 1.55 0.31 1.49
Positive mood ---- ---- 0.17 1.57 0.10 0.89 0.10 0.90
BIS*High Loss ---- ---- ---- ---- −0.53 −6.91*** −0.53 −6.32***
Extra * High Rew. ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.17 5.37*** 0.18 5.30***
Neg. mood * Hi Loss ---- ---- ---- ---- −0.19 −1.75 −0.19 −1.70
Pos. Mood * Hi Rew ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.14 2.59** 0.14 2.64**
Early * BIS ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- −0.05 −0.36
Early * Extravert ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- −0.10 −1.67
Early * Hi Loss ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- −0.11 −0.17
Early * Hi Rew ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.60 1.27
Early * Bis * High Loss ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- −0.09 −0.42
Early * Ex * Hi Rew ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- −0.08 −0.92
Autoregressive (1) −0.06 −6.16*** −0.06 −6.18*** −0.06 −6.22*** −0.06 −6.64***
Note: For the simplest, intercept only, model the coefficient associated with the intercept is .50 (t - 6.80), whether or
not the autocorrelation term is included. The Autoregressive (1) value for this model is -0.05, (z - 5.17).
2.4 Results
We began our analysis with the simple baseline,
“intercept-only,” model. The dependent variable is the
decision to choose a card, with a value of 1 indicating
that the card was chosen and 0 indicating that it was not.
Because the dependent variable is a dichotomy, we used
generalized linear models (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002),
employing a Glimmix procedure within SAS. The Glim-
mix procedure is a subroutine designed to transform lin-
ear mixed models to formats that can incorporate dichoto-
mous dependent variables as well as other data transfor-
mations such as logs (Littell et al., 1996).
The intercept-only model is equivalent to a logistic re-
gression testing the null hypothesis that individuals all
have the same proportion of decisions to accept a card.
Results indicate that subjects do differ significantly in this
tendency (z = 5.39, p < .001)6
The models designed to replicate the material in Peters
6When the dependent variable is measured on an interval scale the
results with this model provide additional information. Specifically,
the estimate of the variance between subjects, the differences between
the subjects in their decisions, can be compared to the estimate of the
“residual variance,” the variance that is within subjects (the variance of
scores around the average for each subject). These two values can be
used to determine the proportion of variance in decisions (the dependent
variable) that can be attributed to differences between individuals. This
is called the intraclass correlation coefficient (rho) and is calculated by
dividing the variance between individuals by the sum of this variance
and that for the residual.
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and Slovic (2000, Tables 3 and 4) using mixed model-
ing are shown in Table 3. The first model includes all
the within-subject variables: the money received from
the previous play, the money received from the previous
play with the presented deck, and the dummy variables
for the nature of the presented deck. Model 2 adds the
two reactivity measures (BIS and extravert) and the two
mood measures; Model 3 adds interactions of BIS with
the high punishment deck, extraversion scores with the
high-reward deck, negative mood with the high punish-
ment deck, and positive mood with the high-reward deck.
Finally, Model 4 adds a dummy variable indicating that
the choices occurred in the first fifth of the game and in-
teractions of these early choices with BIS and extraver-
sion and with high loss and high-reward decks respec-
tively.7
Each of the models in Table 3 includes an autoregres-
sive term to control for the fact that the same individ-
ual makes multiple decisions. The autoregressive term
can simply be seen as a correlation (varying from −1.00
to +1.00) between the choices that individuals make on
successive decisions. Note that, for this data set, the au-
toregressive term is quite small in magnitude and negative
for all models. (See the last row of figures, labeled Au-
toregressive (1) in Table 3.) This indicates that a subject
who agrees to accept a card at one opportunity is slightly
less likely to accept a card at the next opportunity (con-
trolling for all of the other variables in a model). The
autoregressive term is included to control for similarities
within individuals in their decision-making patterns; and
including this control helps ensure that the estimates of
other effects are more accurate.
The regression coefficients associated with the vari-
ables in each of the models are given in Table 3. Because
the dependent variable is a dichotomy, the regression co-
efficients are logs of the odds of choosing a card. A co-
efficient of zero indicates that an increase or decrease in
the independent variable is not associated with subjects
selecting additional cards from that deck or deck type,
positive values indicate that a higher score is related to
choosing a given card, and negative values indicate that a
higher score is related to subjects rejecting a given card in
7When the dependent variable is measured on an interval scale it
is possible to compare various models when one model is a subset of
another. Three different statistics are commonly used in these compar-
isons: 1) comparing the between- subject variance from one model to
another, using a proportionate reduction of error calculation; 2) com-
paring log likelihood ratios associated with each model using standard
procedures of model fit; and 3) examining Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion
(BIC) (Schwarz, 1978), a number calculated from the Likelihood Ratio
Chi-square value, the number of variables in the model, and the number
of cases (see Singer, 1998 and Raudenbush and Bryk 2002 for details).
Unfortunately, such statistics are not yet available for analyses that use
the glimmix procedure to produce logistic regressions or other proce-
dures appropriate for non-intervally measured dependent variables (Phil
Gibbs, SAS Corporation, personal communication, March 13, 2006).
similar fashion. The t-values associated with each coeffi-
cient test the null hypothesis that a coefficient equals zero.
The values may also be exponentiated to compute the as-
sociated odds.8 For instance, with the base-line intercept-
only model, the coefficient of .50 (t=6.80) associated with
the intercept indicates that subjects are significantly more
likely to accept a card than to reject a card. To convert
this log odds ratio to log odds we simply exponentiate
the value of this coefficient (e.50 = 1.64), indicating that
the odds of a subject choosing rather than rejecting a card
are 1.64 to 1.
The results in Table 3 indicate that all of the level one
variables significantly influence subjects’ choices. Sub-
jects were significantly less likely to accept a card if their
last decision to accept a card produced a higher payoff.
This result runs counter to the affect-as-information (af-
fect heuristic) hypothesis, but is consistent with previous
research by Isen (1999) who finds that subjects in posi-
tive moods are more averse to risks in real choices than
those in neutral moods, presumably in order to maintain
their positive mood. Thus, subjects who received a higher
payoff from a previous choice may have been in a more
positive task-induced mood state and, when confronted
with the next risky choice (and all of these choices are
risky), were more likely to reject that deck. At the same
time, subjects were significantly more likely to accept a
card if their previous accept decision from that specific
deck had produced a higher payoff. Finally, subjects’
choices varied significantly between decks. These find-
ings support the expectation that subjects learned about
characteristics of the decks and were not influenced only
by moods. Note that these influences could not be ob-
served, or controlled, in the original analysis because all
choices were aggregated and choices for each deck were
examined in separate equations.
The coefficients associated with the between-subjects
variables indicate that, net of the immediate influence of
previous plays in the game, the measures of individual
differences significantly influenced choice of cards. For
the most part, these influences are parallel to the origi-
nal hypotheses of Peters and Slovic. The BIS, extraver-
sion, and mood variables do not affect choice by them-
selves, but only in combination or interaction with the
characteristics of the cards. (Compare results in Model 2
with those in Models 3 and 4.) Specifically, subjects with
greater reactivity to negative events (higher BIS scores)
were significantly less likely to choose cards from the
high-loss decks (significant two-way interaction of BIS
and high-loss decks). Contrary to expectations and the
results in the original analysis, however, this pattern was
not stronger in the early stages of the game (as indicated
8Probably the easiest way to do these calculations is through Ex-
cel, or another spreadsheet program, and the (exp) function; or with a
calculator.
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by the insignificant three-way interaction). Using simple
arithmetic and the values for the dummy variables asso-
ciated with time in the game and type of deck (shown
in Table 2), the coefficients associated with the BIS mea-
sure for both high-loss decks and other types of decks can
be easily calculated from the results in Model 3: –.56 for
high-loss decks and –.03 for other decks.9 In other words,
the measure of negative reactivity (BIS) has an influence
on only choices from the high-loss decks.
Similarly, as expected, there are significant interactions
with the measure of extraversion, but again only the two-
way interactions are significant. Subjects with higher ex-
traversion scores are more likely to choose cards from
high-gain decks and less likely to choose cards from low-
gain decks. Calculations indicate that the coefficient as-
sociated with extraversion is .08 for cards from the high-
gain decks, but –.09 for cards from the low-gain decks.
It is important to remember that these results are in-
dependent of subjects’ pre-task mood. However, in con-
trast to what was expected from the original study, the
interaction of positive mood and choices from the high-
gain decks was significant. Subjects with a more posi-
tive pretest mood were more likely to choose cards from
the high-gain decks even with the strong controls re-
lated to type of deck and previous payments. No signif-
icant effects were found for negative mood. This mood-
congruency effect had been hypothesized but not found
in the earlier study.
Finally, the results provide insight into the processes
that guide subjects as they explore in this task. The sig-
nificant coefficient associated with choices early in the
game indicates that subjects were more likely to select
rather than reject cards in the early stages of the game
and that exploratory behavior declined with experience.
However, as indicated by the insignificant interactions in
Model 4, the effects of the measures of individual dif-
ferences were consistent from early to later stages of the
game and across the decks that were used.
To summarize, these results generally replicate the
findings of the earlier analysis, but do so through the
use of one equation rather than several, providing a much
more parsimonious analysis and a more completely spec-
ified model. Because the analysis controls for the in-
fluence of immediate experiences within the game, esti-
mates of the effects of measures of individual differences,
9These coefficients are calculated by summing the coefficients as-
sociated with the various component elements related to BIS in Table
3. For instance, the coefficient associated with BIS for high-loss decks
(–.56) is the sum of the coefficient for BIS (–.03) and the interaction of
BIS and high-loss decks (–.53). The coefficient for BIS for non-high-
loss decks later in the game (zero value for high-loss deck) is simply
equal to the coefficient for BIS (–0.03). As noted in the text, these co-
efficients can be exponentiated to obtain odds for making a choice at
various values of BIS. Coefficients from Model 3 were used for this
calculation because the 3 way interactions added in Model 4 were in-
significant.
such as BIS and extraversion, should be more accurate.
In addition, the technique allows the exploration of hy-
potheses that could not have been examined with other
methods. Specifically, we were able to examine the way
in which information gained through the game affects de-
cision making and how the process of decision making
changes throughout the game. These findings could not
have been obtained through the earlier analysis technique
and are important both substantively and theoretically.10
3 Study 2: Using mixed models to
analyze results from a prisoner’s
dilemma game
Our second example comes from an experimental de-
sign that used a group-level prisoner’s dilemma game to
examine the relationship of perceived attractiveness to
outcomes. Subjects in this experiment (Mulford, et al.,
1998) were divided into 32 seven-person groups. In these
groups they participated in two rounds of six games, one
with each person in the group. Subjects played with ma-
trices with three different levels of difficulty, and the same
matrix was used with a given partner in both rounds of
play.11
Table 4 summarizes the design of the study. As listed
in the table, the groups differed in the choices that were
made, whether or not they had feedback, and whether or
not the decision was the same from one round to the next.
Half of the groups had a two-step process, first making a
decision whether or not to enter play with the other per-
son and then choosing whether or not to cooperate. Half
of the groups made only the standard cooperate/defect
choice; in other words they only had to decide whether or
not to cooperate with the other person. Half of the groups
had the same set of choices in both rounds, and half of the
groups received feedback on the results of the first round
before playing the second. The design resulted in eight
possible combinations of conditions with two groups in
each of these conditions. As shown in Table 4, slightly
less than half of the subjects with the option to opt-out
of the game did so. Of those who played the game, only
about one-third chose to cooperate with their partner.
At the time of making each decision, subjects indicated
their perception of the probability that the person they
were playing with would cooperate. At the end of play
they gave ratings of the attractiveness of all others in the
10The original analysis of Peters and Slovic only examined the first
100 choices subjects made. When our analysis was restricted to only
these choices we obtained the same results as reported here.
11The payouts were as follows:
Matrix 1: cc = 2,2; cd = -7,5; dc = 5,-7; dd = -4,-4.
Matrix 2: cc = 1,1; cd = -4,4, dc = 4,-4; dd = -1,-1.
Matrix 3: cc = 1,1; cd = -2,2; dc = 2,-2; dd = -1.-1.
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Table 4: Design of Mulford, et al., experiment and choices made by round of play
Condition Trinary, Round 1 Trinary, Round 2 Feedback Number of Subjects
1 X X 21
2 X 19
3 X X X 22
4 X X 21
5 X 27
6 26
7 X X 26
8 X 23
Total 185
Choices Round 1 Round 2 Total
Opt-Out 41% 40% 41%
Play 59% 60% 59%
Total 100% 100% 100%
N (choices) 552 576 1128
Defect 63% 68% 65%
Cooperate 37% 32% 35%
Total 100% 100% 100%
N (choices) 882 879 1761
Note: Subjects in the “trinary” condition had two sets of choices. The first was whether or
not to enter play and the second was whether to cooperate or defect with the partner. In this
condition only subjects who chose to enter play made the cooperate/defect decision.
Subjects who did not give ratings on the attractiveness measure or who gave all others the
same score were eliminated from the analysis.
group as well as themselves. Subjects that either gave all
players the same attractiveness rating, or who refused to
give the ratings, were omitted from the analysis, leaving
185 subjects (see Mulford et al., 1998, for details).
The published article focused on the influence of rat-
ings of attractiveness on subjects’ choices. The origi-
nal analysis did not aggregate decisions across subjects
but used decisions as the unit of analysis, a procedure
that, as noted above, is not typical in the field. Deci-
sions (play/not play and cooperate/defect) were regressed
on the gender of the subject, gender of other, subjects’
expectation that the other would cooperate, subjects’
self-rating of attractiveness, and subjects’ rating of the
other’s attractiveness. Findings indicated that subjects
were more likely to enter play and to cooperate with oth-
ers that they found attractive. Men who saw themselves
as more attractive more often cooperated than other men,
while women who saw themselves as more attractive co-
operated less often than other women. In addition, there
was a significant interaction of self-ratings and ratings of
others, with those who saw themselves as attractive espe-
cially likely to cooperate with others that they perceived
to be attractive. The effect of perceived attractiveness on
decisions was independent of expectations of others’ co-
operation.
To control for the possibility that individuals have cer-
tain patterns of decision-making that might persist across
a game, a dummy variable was included for each indi-
vidual in the analysis. This procedure could be seen as a
gallant attempt to control for individual differences, but it
consumed a large number of degrees of freedom. In addi-
tion, and, perhaps more important, this loss of degrees of
freedom led the researchers to ignore the possible effect
of feedback on decisions and any differences between the
matrices used in the game. The original analysis only ex-
amined decisions in the first round of play and ignored
the possible effects of different decision matrices.
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Table 5: Regression (HLM) of decision to play (Mulford et al.) on gender of subject and other, matrix of play, ratings
of attractiveness, and feedback.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Fixed Effects Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t
Intercept 0.60 1.70 −0.20 −0.51 0.98 1.17
Level 1 (Within-Subject) Variables:
Matrix 2 1.41 8.10*** 1.39 7.64*** 1.39 7.63***
Matrix 3 1.82 9.84*** 1.81 9.41*** 1.81 9.37***
Round 2 −0.16 −0.63 −0.15 −0.60 −0.16 −0.64
Male other 0.04 0.26 0.06 0.39 0.07 0.42
Subject’s rating of other’s attractiveness 0.08 2.51** 0.14 3.61*** 0.14 3.66***
Subject’s expectation other will defect −0.03 −8.18*** −0.02 −5.05*** −0.02 −5.12***
Feedback −0.54 −1.60 2.40 3.35*** 2.41 3.35***
Feedback by other’s attractiveness ---- ---- −0.19 −2.85*** −0.19 −2.88**
Feedback by expectation of other ---- ---- −0.03 −3.97*** −0.03 −3.91***
Level 2 (Between-Subject) Variables:
Male subject ---- ---- ---- ---- −0.49 −1.33
Subject’s self rating of attractiveness ---- ---- ---- ---- −0.13 −1.32
Autoregressive (1) 0.13 3.41*** 0.13 3.04** 0.13 3.12**
Note: For the simplest, intercept only, model the coefficient associated with the intercept is .36 (t=2.80**).
When the autocorrelation term is added the intercept value is .44 (t=2.92**). The autocorrelation term in this
model is .19 (z = 4.76***). Intermediate models with only some of the Level 1 variables were examined and
coefficients were remarkably similar until the interaction terms were added.
We suggest that a more appropriate analysis for this
data set involves a mixed model, including an autoregres-
sive term to model dependencies between individual de-
cisions. Using a mixed model provides a more appro-
priate control for individual tendencies to react in given
ways and also allows us to examine the effects of feed-
back and different matrices on subjects’ decisions, tests
that were not possible with the techniques that were pre-
viously used. Understanding how feedback affects the re-
sults is substantively important. Even though the results
from the first round of play indicate that others’ attrac-
tiveness induced a decision to play and cooperate, even
when they thought the other would not cooperate, perhaps
subjects learn from experiences. If such learning occurs
we could expect a significant interaction between feed-
back and ratings of attractiveness. Including the matrix
of play also provides an important control, helping to de-
termine the extent to which choices reflect characteristics
of the game (the presented matrix) or individual differ-
ences in cooperative behavior. Neither of these questions
could be examined with the original analysis.
3.1 Decisions to play
Table 5 summarizes the models for the analysis of the de-
cision to play. Predictor variables at the level of decisions
(level one) include the matrix that was used in the play,
whether the play occurred in round one or two, gender of
the other person, the subject’s rating of the other’s attrac-
tiveness, the expectation that the other would cooperate,
and whether or not the play occurred after the subject had
received feedback. Predictor variables at level two, the
level of the decision maker, are the gender of the subject
and the subject’s self-rating of attractiveness.
The results with the intercept-only model indicate that
individual subjects vary in their choices to enter play (z
= 5.85, p < .001). In addition, the autocorrelation term
is both positive and significant (.19 in the intercept-only
model) and, as shown in Table 5, slightly smaller, but still
significant, in the more complex models. This indicates
that subjects tend to make the same decision from one
encounter to the next.
The results in Model 1 in Table 5, which includes
only the level one, or within- subject variables, replicate
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the original work with subjects more likely to enter play
when they perceive that the other person in the interaction
is more attractive and less likely to play when they believe
that the other person will not cooperate with them. In ad-
dition, the results document the strong influence of the
matrix of play on decisions, something that was not con-
trolled in the original analysis. Subjects were much more
likely to choose to play with others (even with expec-
tations and perceived attractiveness of others controlled)
with the two matrices that provide less risk of loss.
While simply receiving feedback about the previous
decision of the other person did not affect subjects’ over-
all tendency to play (as shown by the insignificant coef-
ficient associated with feedback in Model 1), there were
significant interactions of feedback with both the percep-
tions of others’ attractiveness and expectations that the
other would defect (Models 2 and 3). Subjects who did
not receive feedback about the result of their first round
of play continued to be more likely to play with others
whom they saw as attractive (b for attractiveness = .14),
no matter what their expectation of the other’s behavior.
In contrast, those who did receive feedback were actually
somewhat less likely than other people to play with others
they saw as attractive (b for attractiveness = –.05). These
differences are not trivial. For instance, if a subject rated
the other person as a 10 (out of a range of 1–11) the odds
that they would choose to play with him/her were 3.2 to
1.0 if they had not received feedback regarding their de-
cision in round 1, but about even (1.1 to 1.0) if they had
received feedback. If the other person received a rating
of 5 (the middle to low part of the scale), the odds of the
subject choosing to play were 1.6 to one without feedback
and 1.4 to 1.0 if they had received feedback.12
In addition, the interaction of feedback and expecta-
tions of others was statistically significant; that is, feed-
back led subjects to be even more attuned to their ex-
pectations regarding others’ defection. For those with-
out feedback the b associated with expectations = –0.02;
for those with feedback the b associated with expecta-
tions = –0.05. The between-subject variables (subject’s
gender and self ratings of attractiveness) had no influ-
ence on subjects’ decisions to play and the coefficients
associated with the within-subject variables remained un-
changed when these variables were added in Model 3.
3.2 Decisions to cooperate
Table 6 gives the coefficients associated with variables in
the models predicting cooperative behavior. As with the
decision to play, the results with the intercept-only model
indicate that individual subjects vary in their choice to
12These results were calculated in the manner explained in footnote
9.
cooperate (z = 6.73, p < .001). In addition, the autocor-
relation term is both positive and significant (.11) in the
intercept-only model and slightly smaller, but still signif-
icant, in the more complex models. This indicates that
subjects tend to make the same decision from one en-
counter to the next, although this tendency is not as strong
as with the decision to play.
The strongest influence on subjects’ decision to coop-
erate is their expectation of the others’ behavior, followed
by the impact of Matrix 2. If subjects expect the other in
the interaction to defect or if they played with Matrix 2,
they were less likely to cooperate. At the same time, as
found in the original study, when subjects played with
others they perceived as being more attractive they were
more likely to cooperate, independent of their expecta-
tions of the other’s behavior.
In contrast to the analysis of decisions to play, the in-
fluence of perceptions of others’ attractiveness persisted
even when the presence of feedback was controlled. Also
in contrast to the analysis of decisions to play, interac-
tions involving subject-level variables also significantly
influenced choices. Specifically, women who saw them-
selves as more attractive were less likely to cooperate, but
self ratings of attractiveness had virtually no influence for
men (b for attractiveness = –.25 for women and +.03 for
men). In addition, there was a significant tendency for
subjects who saw themselves as attractive to also coop-
erate with others whom they saw as attractive. Both of
these results replicated the findings obtained in the origi-
nal study.13
Again, the differences are not trivial. If subjects rated
themselves as 10 on the 11 point scale of attractiveness,
the odds of cooperating with others would be .85 to 1
for male subjects, but only .40 to 1 for female subjects
(assuming all other characteristics were at the mean). The
situation is reversed for those who rate themselves lower
in attractiveness. Men who rated themselves as 5 would
have an odds of cooperating of .42 to 1, while the odds
for women are .80 to 1.14
To summarize, the results from our reanalysis of the
data from Mulford and associates (1998) support their
original findings, but provide important extensions and
elaborations, none of which could have been accom-
plished with the original analytical technique. Specifi-
cally, the extended analyses confirm that subjects in pris-
oner dilemma games are more likely to enter play and to
cooperate with others whom they perceive to be more at-
13The three way interaction of gender, self ratings and ratings of oth-
ers was insignificant, indicating that the result held for both men and
women. In addition, neither of the significant interactions regarding
subject level variables that appeared in the analysis of cooperation ap-
peared in the analysis of play decisions.
14Again, these figures were calculated by substituting average values
for all variables except those that vary in the interactions, calculating
the expected value, and exponentiating the results.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 1, No. 2, November 2006 Mixed models, IGT and prisoner’s dilemma 20
Table 6: Regression (HLM) of decision to cooperate (Mulford et al.) on gender of subject and other, matrix of play,
ratings of attractiveness, and feedback.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fixed Effects Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t
Intercept 0.44 1.58 0.49 1.66 1.14 1.88 2.45 3.10**
Level 1 (Within-Subject) Variables:
Matrix 2 −0.65 −4.60*** −0.66 −4.61*** −0.66 −4.60*** −0.64 −4.52***
Matrix 3 0.22 1.63 0.22 1.62 0.22 1.63 0.23 1.68
Round 2 −0.12 −0.78 −0.12 −0.77 −0.11 −0.75 −0.12 −0.78
Male other −0.21 −1.72 −0.21 −1.71 −0.21 −1.70 −0.22 −1.81
Other’s attract. 0.10 3.52*** 0.09 3.09** 0.09 3.17** 0.07 2.10*
Expectation of other −0.03 −10.94*** −0.03 −9.88*** −0.03 −9.90*** −0.03 −9.89***
Feedback −0.26 −1.18 −0.55 −0.93 −0.55 −0.94 −0.58 −0.99
Feedback X other attractiveness ---- ---- 0.03 0.46 0.03 0.47 0.04 0.54
Feedback X expectation of other ---- ---- 0.002 0.29 0.002 0.29 0.002 0.28
Level 2 (Between-Subject) Variables:
Male subject ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.07 0.26 −2.04 −1.85
Self rating of attractiveness ---- ---- ---- ---- −0.09 −1.27 −0.25 −2.58**
Male * self rating ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.28 1.98*
Both High Attract. ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.55 2.31*
Autoregressive (1) 0.09 2.89** 0.09 2.90** 0.09 2.89** 0.09 2.97**
Note: For the baseline intercept only model the coefficient associated with the intercept is -.85 (t=6.66***). When the
autocorrelation term is added, the coefficient associated with the intercept changes only slightly (-0.82, t = 6.61***).
The autocorrelation term in the base line model is .11 (t=3.73***). Intermediate models with only some of the Level
1 variables were examined and coefficients were remarkably similar until the interaction terms were added.
tractive, even when they expect that the others will not
cooperate with them. At the same time, the results sug-
gest that receiving feedback about the results of the game
can alter the impact of perceived attractiveness of oth-
ers, at least with respect to the decision to enter play with
others. Results with the analysis of cooperate decisions
confirm the role of perceived attractiveness of others and
expectations of others’ behavior, but also indicate that re-
ceiving feedback had no effect on these influences. In
other results that could not be obtained with the original
analysis, the results with mixed modeling illustrate the
important impact of the matrix of play on decisions and
demonstrate (through the measure of autocorrelation) the
extent to which individuals maintain consistent patterns
of decision making from one decision to another.
4 Discussion and general applica-
tions
Using a general mixed model approach appears to have
a number of advantages over the analyses used in the
original articles and analyses common within the field.
First, and perhaps most important, mixed models allow
us to take advantage of the full richness of these types
of decision-making data sets. These very flexible tech-
niques allow researchers to explore changes in behavior
throughout a game, include a range of control variables,
and test hypotheses that otherwise could not be examined
regarding the process by which decisions are made. The
models also allow researchers to examine a wide range
of possible interaction effects that could be theoretically
and substantively important.
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Second, while researchers in this field have used a va-
riety of specific multivariate techniques in the past, we
suggest that mixed models are more flexible, can be used
with a wider variety of experimental designs, and can
test hypotheses related to associations on varied levels
of analysis (e.g. decisions, individuals, and their inter-
actions). For instance, repeated measures analyses of
variance are useful when the number of repeated trials
is not overly large (e.g. Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999),
but are much harder to use and interpret when the num-
ber of decisions is larger, a situation that is very com-
mon within the field. Similarly, the models used by
Busemeyer, Yechiam, and their associates (Busemeyer
and Stout 2002; Yechiam and Busemeyer, 2005, 2006;
Yechiam, et al., 2005) to examine repeated decisions in
the Iowa Gambling Task are elegant and useful for that
application, but more difficult to apply to a more general
setting and generally only examine variables at the de-
cision level. The mixed model approach applied to the
modified Iowa Gambling Task in this study not only tests
hypotheses regarding decision level variables, but also
hypotheses regarding individual differences related to the
subjects in the study and interactions between variables
on the decision and individual levels.
Third, using mixed models can result in analytic mod-
els that more closely match theoretical views of how de-
cisions occur. Our theories about decision making often
address changing experiences throughout a game, which
require that we examine individual decisions. We can ex-
amine these questions in the mixed model framework.
Using these techniques can also help determine the im-
pact of different characteristics of a design, such as the
three different matrices used in the Mulford et al. pris-
oner dilemma game or the relative attractiveness of differ-
ent card choices in the Peters and Slovic modified Iowa
Gambling Task.
Fourth, correct specification of analytic models is more
likely when we have the flexibility of the mixed-model
approach. As one example, decisions may be related over
time and we can correct for such dependencies by noting
that decisions are nested within subjects and by including
an autoregressive term. Using decisions as a unit of anal-
ysis also makes it possible to include a wider, and more
appropriate, set of control variables, especially those that
are directly related to actual decision making processes.
This helps assure that estimates of individual differences
are more accurate.
Fifth, the statistical characteristics of mixed models
provide both appropriate controls and substantively im-
portant information. For instance, the autoregressive term
provides not only an efficient method of controlling for
dependencies, such as the tendency for individuals to be-
have in similar ways on successive opportunities to play
a game, but also provides substantive information about
the magnitude and direction of such a tendency. In the
analyses in this paper, the results with the card selection
task suggested that there was little consistency and more
exploratory behavior in choice from one selection to the
next, while results with the prisoner dilemma data sug-
gested a more consistent pattern.
Finally, when the dependent variable is measured on an
interval scale (e.g., a task that involved receiving points or
variable amounts of money), rather than as a dichotomy,
as occurred in our analyses, additional statistical tech-
niques are available. Specifically, it is possible to com-
pare the relative fit of various models and to calculate the
percentage of variation that can be attributed to the dif-
ferent levels of analysis. (See footnotes 6 and 7.)
While the computations involved in a mixed-model
analysis are certainly more complex than those that are
often used in analyses of decision making data sets, they
are not overly onerous. The most important first step is
making sure that data are recorded in a way that maintains
decisions, rather than individuals, as the unit of analysis.
Several different statistical programs provide the capac-
ity for conducting these analyses. We have used SAS be-
cause it is widely available, allows the easy importation
of data from other programs, and is very flexible. Both
Singer (1998) and Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) provide
very useful guides to the steps involved in using the statis-
tical software; and in an appendix to this paper we include
the language that we used for our analyses.
Even though mixed models provide many advantages
when compared to the simpler techniques often used in
the field, there are still limitations. One of the most im-
portant involves the number of independent variables that
can be used. As with any analysis, researchers should be
careful to limit the number of variables related to a given
level (e.g. individuals or decisions) relative to the sample
size on that level.15
In general, however, we believe that mixed models pro-
vide a more effective, efficient, and flexible way of ana-
15A standard rule of thumb is the ratio of no more than one variable
for every five to ten subjects. For instance, with the decision to play in
the Mulford et al. study, there were 1,128 choices and 96 people. Model
3 in this analysis used nine variables related to the decisions and two
related to the subjects, well within these suggested limits. With the final
model in Table 3, the reanalysis of the Peters and Slovic data, with over
12,000 decisions and 72 subjects, there are six variables related to the
decisions, four related to the subjects and ten that involve interactions
of subjects and decisions, a level that approaches the suggested limits.
Note that the limits on subject level variables are no different than those
that would occur in traditional analyses that aggregate data to the subject
level. The method that we propose is, we believe, superior because it
allows us to also examine variability in decisions within games. Even
studies with clinical populations, which typically have much smaller
samples, could conceivably use this approach. For instance, Bechara
et al. (1996) had nineteen subjects (seven patients and twelve controls),
with over 150 decisions per subject, which could allow the use of several
variables on the decision level as well as the distinction between patients
and controls on the subject level of analysis.
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lyzing data from decision-making experiments than the
traditional methods of aggregating data across decisions.
Mixed models allow researchers to test complex hypothe-
ses directly relevant to the way in which decisions are
made, to obtain estimates of variance explained by both
individual and game related characteristics, and to have
more accurate estimates of effects. Using these more ap-
propriate techniques is an important step in advancing our
understanding of decision making.
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